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 Good Work 
Sam Clark explores what it takes for work to contribute to 
human flourishing 
Work is both a central arena of self-making, self-understanding, and self-development, 
and a deep threat to our flourishing. We inhabitants of market societies spend large parts 
of our lives working, by comparison, for example, with hunter-gatherers. So, work is a 
pressing ethical problem for us, about which recent moral and political philosophy has 
said surprisingly little. My question is: what kind of work is good for human beings, and 
what kind bad? What work is to human flourishing as eating your greens and doing thirty 
minutes of exercise a day is to human health? What work is fatty food, cigarettes, and too 
much beer? 
My answer develops a self-realisation account of the good: (1) human flourishing is the 
development and expression of human potential; (2) this happens over a lifetime through 
appropriate practice—that is, what we do shapes who and what we become. So, our 
institutions, habits, rituals, roles, strategies, and tools need critical scrutiny. Do they aid 
our development? Do they thwart it? Worse, do they distort it? 
Work is a problem of human development, and I address it by asking, for three central 
human capacities, what each capacity needs from our work if it’s to develop towards its 
full expression. My answers lead to an account of good work as requiring pleasure, skill, 
and democracy. 
My first capacity is that humans are passionate choosers. We are choosers: we are partly 
self-directed, face dilemmas, pick between options. And we are motivated choosers: we 
yearn towards some things and flinch away from others. Good work, therefore, needs to 
engage our motivational psychology, and especially to engage our capacity for pleasure, 
in three ways. 
First, pleasure in the product of work: Good work makes things we can take pleasure in. 
A repellent product, as when I make cheap rubbish or add to the confusion and 
unhappiness of the world, means that my work is bad. Work that makes pleasing 
things—a beautiful and useful table, an enjoyable novel, laughing children—is good 
work. 
Second, there is pleasure in rest after work: good work is not excessive or debilitating, 
but is enough to feel that my powers have been exercised, and to enjoy a well-earned 
rest in which they’re replenished. 
Third, there is pleasure in the work itself: This could be the unself-conscious absorption—
flow, being in the zone—which we sometimes find in running or making music. But 
pleasure in the work itself also needs complex structure over time: (1) Waking a 
particular capacity, as when I hear Beethoven for the first time, in which there is an 
intense joy of discovery, which motivates pursuit. (2) Deepening pleasure through 
developing perception and understanding, as when I get to know Beethoven’s late string 
quartets. Here there is a distinct pleasure of repetition, as I get more out of each listen. 
(3) Overcoming obstacles to engagement, which, once passed, reveal further vistas, as 
when I don’t understand the Grosse Fugue that originally closed String Quartet 13. Here 
there is frustration at the obstacle, but also pleasurable expectation of its anticipated 
overcoming, and new pleasure in the new depth that overcoming reveals. There is a 
stepwise process of development: gradual deepening, stalling at an obstacle, and getting 
past it into new depths. 
What I’ve said so far is incomplete in that my example of the pleasures of listening to 
music is passive: it’s a matter of consumption not of action, and that won’t do as an 
account of good work. We need to consider another capacity. 
My second capacity is that humans are skilled makers. We are makers: we’re handy, we 
reach out to shape and use the world for our own purposes. And we’re skilled makers: 
we get better at particular kinds of shaping only by attempting it. I can’t learn to play the 
guitar just by reading about it; I have to do it. We develop skill by using it: our activity of 
shaping the world reshapes us. 
To be skill-developing, our activity needs two features: (1) A particular kind of object, with 
a complex internal landscape of depth and obstacles—plains to cross, space to explore, 
mountains and rivers to struggle over, vistas revealing what can be seen but not yet 
reached. Examples of such objects include music, mathematics, carpentry, philosophy, 
and medicine. But this complexity on its own isn’t enough, because one way of dealing 
with complex objects is Taylorism, that is, dividing up a complex activity into its smallest 
components and distributing them across different people. This is very efficient for 
productive purposes but it’s not skill-developing. Skill-development also requires (2) a 
particular relation to the object, in which I move from absorption in detail to self-conscious 
overview of the whole and of my performance in relation to it; I respond to feedback from 
resistance, and can test that resistance with various approaches; I problem-find as well 
as problem-solve; I have self-direction in response to the object, rather than just applying 
a predetermined technique or tool to it. That is, I am an autonomous worker, who forms 
and acts on my own plans, changes those plans in response to my successes and 
failures, and transforms myself by doing so. 
Summing up my first and second capacities: the human capacity of passionate choice 
demands pleasure of several kinds in work; the human capacity of skilled making 
demands skill-developing objects and forms of work. These are actually two aspects of 
the same thing: our complex relation—active, sometimes absorbed in detail, sometimes 
self-conscious and self-assessing—to complex objects with depth and resistance. This is 
an experience of pleasurable development: we delight in our own increasing mastery. 
We could imagine a benevolent boss providing work like this—think of a classical 
orchestra with an inspiring conductor. That would be pretty good work, but it wouldn’t be 
good enough. 
The third capacity I want to pick out is that humans are social negotiators. We act 
together—compare asocial snakes—and we act together by negotiating—compare ants, 
which act together, but not by trying to explain reasons or evoke sympathy. 
Our social negotiation requires two reciprocal kinds of capacity. On one side are 
expressive capacities: we give reasons, express passions, describe our situations, give 
information, teach, mock, take the initiative, and perform. And on the other side are 
receptive capacities: we hear reasons and incorporate them in deliberation, sympathize, 
picture others’ situations and take up their perspectives, hear information and change our 
beliefs, learn, get taken down a peg in good humour, go along with an initiative, and act 
as audience. 
One human organizational possibility is hierarchy, in which the opportunities to exercise 
and therefore to develop these capacities are distributed across different people. There 
are givers and takers of orders, a division of labour in social negotiation. Like the 
Taylorized workplace, this can be efficient: armies so organized can do astonishing 
things. But it leads to hypertrophy of one set of capacities and atrophy of the other. 
Development is unbalanced on both sides of the division between expressive and 
receptive capacities, and this is developmentally bad for the individuals who make up the 
hierarchical community. 
A developmentally better possibility is a social organization in which everyone practices 
both kinds of capacity. Everyone is sometimes expressive and sometimes receptive. I 
call this possibility democracy. 
People in democracies are better off—they get more kinds of developmental practice, 
and are therefore more fully developed human beings—than people in hierarchies. 
Compare the classical orchestra with group improvisation in jazz, folk, or gamelan music, 
where there are chances to speak and to listen, to lead and to follow, to solo and to 
accompany, to offer new themes and to continue existing ones. 
I began with a self-realization account of the good and a problem: questions about the 
good are questions about human development, and the means of that development is 
practice; work is an important arena of practice but also potential corruption, and 
therefore needs critical examination. I have criticized work by appealing to three central 
human capacities, which work promises to develop or threatens to damage. 
My results can be summarized by an image of good work I’ve already used: group 
musical improvisation, which exercises our nature in three ways. First, as passionate 
choosers, we need pleasure in the product, a musical performance; in rest after; and 
most importantly in the playing itself. This involves flow, but also self-conscious pleasures 
in waking, deepening, and overcoming. Second, as skilled makers we need skill-
development: the gradual development through practice of mastery. Third, as social 
negotiators, we need democracy, in which we practice both expressive and receptive 
skills; in which we all have a voice and an ear and a hand in making our joint activity. We 
can see an example of good work in microcosm in the William Parker Quartet. 
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